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Abstract
We examine a market for a search good in which consumers are uncertain about the
firm’s product quality, but may search to gather information before buying. We show that
credible information can be conveyed to consumers even when the firm faces a market with
little or no preference heterogeneity. Rather, differences in willingness-to-pay arise from the
endogenous search decisions by consumers. A fundamental assumption is that search is not
required for purchase and consumers may bypass it altogether. In this case search induces
a dispersion in preferences that is detrimental for the firm’s ability to capture value. This
provides an incentive for the firm not to overstate its quality.
When quality is common knowledge (but product fit is uncertain before search), in-
creases in quality lead to a higher market price, but firm profits and consumer surplus
are non-monotonic because of changes in the search regime. In particular if quality is
high enough for search to be worthwhile the firm faces downward pressure in prices and
consumers become better off. These effects reverse at higher levels of product quality.
Surprisingly, when product quality is unknown but credible information is available
consumers become worse off with the probability of facing a high type firm, because this
firm prefers to target high value consumers and not serve those who do not find that the
product fits their needs.
∗Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford CA, 94305, USA,
gardete@stanford.edu and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China,
mkguo@ust.hk, respectively.
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1 Introduction
The strategic communication between firms and consumers has been the focus of recent work
by economists and marketing scientists. The underlying tension behind the phenomenon is the
fact that consumers often appear willing to believe advertisements’ claims without verifiability
commitments, evidence or proof. This is especially striking because the objective of the sender
of such messages is likely to be her own welfare maximization rather than the consumers’.
The paradox has found resolution in the idea that under certain circumstances the firm may
have an incentive to publish truthful information in hopes of attracting some preferred segments
of consumers rather than others. For example, Bagwell and Ramey (1993) proposed that low
and high quality firms could differ in their preferences over segments of consumers. When firm
types are significantly different the low end prefers to make small profit margins from multiple
units sold to low valuation consumers, while the high end ones prefer to make high margins off
high valuation consumers willing to buy only a few units. The mechanism at work is related to a
more general principle of informative communication initially proposed by Farrell and Gibbons
(1989). It is that the presence of different audiences can introduce a tradeoff to the sender, which
ultimately grants her credibility. For example, the reason a firm can successfully attract high-
type consumers in the work of Bagwell and Ramey (1993) is because its message simultaneously
detracts low-type consumers from searching. Similarly, a low-type firm would prefer to attract
the low-type consumers at the expense of detracting the high-type ones. This logic informs
the credibility mechanism proposed by Bagwell and Ramey (1993), where advertising “matches
products to buyers.”
In this paper we show that audience heterogeneity is not a fundamental requirement for
advertising credibility to arise, but that instead it can naturally emerge from the search decisions
consumers make and the strategic pricing response by the firm. In contrast with the existing
literature we decouple the search and purchase decisions and show that heterogeneity may emerge
endogenously in the market, as can advertising credibility.
A fundamental assumption in the present work is that the search process by which consumers
gather information about a product or service is not the property of the good itself (i.e., a ‘search
good’ as the work by Nelson (1970) is often interpreted), but it is a decision that consumers can
consider, i.e., search is not required for purchase, but discretionary. In our model information
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acquisition can be interpreted in at least two ways. In the classical interpretation (see Nelson
(1970, 1974)) consumers incur a search cost to learn about product features and attributes before
buying. The cost does not have to be intrinsically monetary, but can include other factors such
as the time and effort associated with learning more about a camera online or at a physical
store. A more novel interpretation is that of deliberation, proposed by Guo and Zhang (2012).
In this case the consumer incurs a cost in order to learn about her own preferences and how
the product characteristics map into her needs. This captures an important aspect of real life
decisions. For example, while buying a camera the consumer may want to carefully consider
how much portability or picture quality is most convenient for her upcoming vacation.
This feature has real-world relevance. For example, an individual may spend a significant
amount of time and effort evaluating a durable camera but no time at all assessing a disposable
one. The amount of effort involved may also depend on whether the product is likely to perform
well and how much can information reduce uncertainty about the product’s performance.
In our model the advertising message is cheap-talk in the sense that the choice of the content
has no relevant cost implications for the firm (as in Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Moreover,
the firm is allowed some legal freedom such that its advertising message need not correspond
perfectly to reality. One instance of this phenomenon is ‘puffery’ in advertising, in which the firm
is allowed to exaggerate its claims in a way that is reasonably expected (see Chakraborty and
Harbaugh (2014) for a detailed discussion and references to the legal framework). Other work
has focused on advertising disclosure, where the firm decides which information to disclose to
consumers but is not allowed to misrepresent itself. Anderson and Renault (2006) and Anderson
and Renault (2013) consider the disclosure decision of firms in a market for a search good with
horizontal and vertical differentiation, respectively. Anand and Shachar (2009) consider the fact
that advertising messages can mean different things to different consumers, and that the firm
may strategically decide how precise its advertising will be. Mayzlin and Shin (2011) consider
the case of bandwidth-limited consumers and show that high quality firms may prefer to refrain
from advertising altogether in order to encourage search.
In the informative advertising literature Bagwell and Ramey (1993) consider the case where
the firm induces search by its favorite customer segment through its advertising strategy. Re-
latedly, Gardete (2013) shows that firms may have an incentive to pool upwards but only to
a certain extent, and that overall surplus may be maximized when they are allowed to do so.
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Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) and Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2014) consider the case of
informative multidimensional advertising. In this case the seller can attain credibility because
she sells a multi-attribute product. Credibility can arise if she emphasizes some of the product
characteristics, but not all.
A related literature started byWernerfelt (1990) considers the role of cheap-talk in advertising
as a means to coordinate consumers’ signaling to each other. Recently, Kuksov, Shachar, and
Wang (2013) investigate a related case where the firm’s advertising decision is affected by the
correlation between consumer preferences for functional and self-expressive attributes as well as
the image these would like to project.
Figure 1: Contingent Willingness-to-pay with known and unknown Product Qualities
The innovation in this paper is that advertising credibility arises endogenously because con-
sumers are allowed to buy irregardless of information acquisition. This assumption yields ex-post
differentiated demand from an ex-ante undifferentiated one. The intuition is aided by Figure
1. Consider a product with some known quality q, which denotes the probability of a consumer
finding that the product fits her needs. In particular, the consumer receives gross utility vH if
she finds a fit, but vL if she does not, and vH > vL > 0. If fit is not known a priori the consumer’s
ex-ante willingness-to-pay is equal to E [v] = q vH + (1− q) vL. However, if she decides to search
to learn more about the fit, her valuation will be vH with probability q and vL with probability
1 − q. This is depicted in panel a) of Figure 1 and summarizes a first important effect: after
search takes place consumer valuations become more heterogeneous as they find whether the
product fits their needs or not. This in turn creates a problem for the firm in terms of consumer
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surplus appropriation: If consumers do not search the firm could capture all of the consumer
welfare by setting price at level p = E [v] and earn profit E [v]. However, when some consumers
search the firm faces a more heterogeneous preference distribution and will become worse off.
In the limit it could receive profits q vH if it set price at level p = vH or it could receive profits
vL if it set price at level p = vL, both of which are lower than the previous case.1 This first case
highlights the fact that as consumers search and find out whether the product fits their needs,
their preferences become more heterogeneous, making it harder for the firm to appropriate value.
Consider now the case of unknown product quality, summarized in panel b) of Figure 1. In
this example nature has the first move and decides whether the firm has a high or a low quality
product, with qH > qL being the respective probabilities of product fit. Consumers do not know
which product quality the firm holds, but as before can determine whether the product fits their
needs through costly search. When they do not search their expected valuation is given by
E [v| I] where I stands for the consumers’ beliefs about quality at the first information set. For
example, if no advertising information is available to consumers their willingness-to-pay (if they
do not search) may be equal to E [v| I] = E [v].
Credibility arises when the firm has an incentive to report its quality truthfully. This can
happen when consumers are more likely to search when they believe the firm is of higher quality
and moreover the high and low quality firm-types prefer prices close to vH and vL, respectively.
By reporting truthfully the low-type firm reduces search and avoids the profit losses from the
resulting market heterogeneity, as explained above. Moreover, if it imitated the high-type firm
it would decrease its profits because the additional searching customers would apply downward
pressure on the price it is able to charge. The high type firm however, is willing to induce more
search because it knows searching consumers are likely to find a fit. Moreover, it can alleviate
the heterogeneity concern if these customers are profitable enough, which ultimately depends on
how high the quality of its product is.
1These profits can be thought of as an upper-bound, since at these price levels consumers would be better off
not searching when facing a strictly positive search cost.
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2 Known Product Quality
2.1 Preliminaries
We first consider a market where a product has quality q ∈ (0, 1). Consumers do not derive
utility from product quality directly. Instead, as quality q increases so does the probability of
consumers finding that the product fits their needs. In particular, with probability q the product
yields gross utility vH upon consumption and with probability 1 − q a consumer receives gross
utility vL, where vH > vL > 0. Moreover, we normalize the utility of not buying to zero.
In this section we assume consumers know the product quality but do not know the product
fit a priori. In order to learn the fit they may engage in costly search. For example, a consumer
may decide to browse different websites for information on the latest trendy gadget; a manager
may decide to meet with a potential supplier to assess the characteristics of a production input.
In general the search process can be thought of as a costly investment that rewards the customer
with product information. Consumers can decide whether they would like to engage in costly
search or not. Only if they decide to search do they incur a search cost c > 0 and learn their own
fit with the product. A fundamental feature of the model is that consumers can buy regardless
of their search decision. Hence, the search decision affects their information but not their ability
to buy the product. Figure 2 presents the timing of the game.
Figure 2: Timing of the Perfect Information Game
Consumers decide
whether to search
Firm sets price Consumers make
purchase decisions
Consumers
observe price. Fit is
revealed to searchers
First, consumers make their search decisions. The firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
through price p. After this, consumers observe price and those who decided to search also
observe their fit with the product. Finally, consumers make their purchase decisions.
Keeping the price disclosure to a later stage is a common assumption in the informative
advertising literature in order to isolate the informational effects of the advertisement, and avoid
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imposing beliefs when inconsistent prices and advertising messages occur. This assumption is
especially useful in Section 3 in order to focus the results on the informativeness of the advertising
message.2
2.2 Customer Decisions
Consider the last stage of the customer decision process: the purchase decision. At this point
she may have decided to search or not. If she decided not to search she will buy if
E [uB] ≥ 0⇔ E [v| q]− p ≥ 0 (1)
where E [v| q] = q vH+(1− q) vL captures the expected gross utility from purchasing the product.
If the consumer has searched, however, the decision to buy depends on whether the product fits
her needs or not. In particular, if fit occurs she buys if
vH − p ≥ 0 (2)
and if fit did not occur she will still decide to buy as long as
vL − p ≥ 0 (3)
Consider now the decision of whether to search or not. At this stage the consumer does not yet
observe the product price, but holds a belief p̂ about it. She decides to search if
E [U (Search)] ≥ max {E [v| q]− p̂, 0} (4)
where the left hand-side captures the expected utility of searching and the right hand-side
captures the best of the two possible scenarios that the consumer may face if she does not
search: she receives the maximum utility between buying the product or not in the absence of
product fit information. In particular, if E [v| q] ≥ p̂ she believes that she will buy the product
if she decides not to search, and if E [v| q] < p̂ she believes that she will not buy the product if
she does not search. We now consider these possibilities in turn.
2See Bagwell and Ramey (1993) and Gardete (2013) for discussions.
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First, let the belief over price be such that E [v| q] ≥ p̂. In this case the consumer searches if
q (vH − p̂)− c ≥ E [v| q]− p̂ (5)
where the left-hand side reflects the expected utility from search, and the right-hand side captures
the expected utility of buying without searching. Note that in order to describe the left-hand
side one needs to consider the fact that price is bounded below by vL. If the price were any
lower the firm could increase its profits by increasing it until vL. If the product does not provide
a fit the consumer always receives zero utility either because she decided not to buy the product
(p > vL), or the price extracts all her product valuation (p = vL). It follows from (5) that when
E [v| q] ≥ p̂ the consumer decides to search if and only if
p̂ ≥ vL + c1− q (6)
Consider now the case where the consumer believes the product is “expensive”, such that
E [v| q] < p̂. In this case she compares the utility from search to the utility of not searching
and not buying. In particular she decides to search when q (vH − p̂)− c ≥ 0, which rearranged
becomes:
p̂ ≤ vH − c
q
(7)
Figure 3 plots how the consumer decisions depend on their beliefs over price.
Figure 3: Price Belief and Search Behavior
{ { {
When the belief over price is low enough (when compared to the search cost) consumers are
willing to buy without searching. As the belief increases search becomes an attractive option.
However, when the belief over price is very high the option value of searching is low, and con-
sumers prefer not to search.
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Proposition 1 (Emergence of search behavior). Search emerges only when q is in-
termediate (q ∈ (q0, q1)). Otherwise, consumers do not search independently of their belief over
price. Moreover, the search cost must be low (4c < vH − vL) for search to take place.
Proposition 1 states that when the probability of finding a fit is very high or very low, search
is not valuable to consumers as they prefer to either buy without searching or not to buy at
all, depending on the price the firm sets.3 This is equivalent to the search range in Figure 3
disappearing for very low or very high values of q. The second part of the proposition states that
the search cost must be small enough vis-a-vis the utility range for search to potentially arise.
When this condition is not met search can never take place and the market outcome becomes
trivial. We assume the search cost is low (4c < vH − vL) for the remainder of the paper. As we
will see in the next section, Proposition 1 informs the nature of the market outcome.
2.3 Market Outcome
Consider the pricing behavior of the firm contingent on the search decision of customers. Ac-
cording to Proposition 1, when quality is very low or very high - i.e., q ∈ (0, q0) ∪ (q1, 1) -
consumers do not search. Given consumer valuations, in this case the firm is better off charging
E [v| q], consumers buy the product without searching and no profitable deviation for either
party exists. Hence, a pure strategy equilibrium with price E [v| q] and no search by consumers
exists whenever the probability of fit is either very high or very low. This is intuitive since the
consumer has less to gain from search if she has a good notion of the utility she can derive from
the product.
When quality is intermediate - i.e., q ∈ ( q0, q1) - the market outcome is more complex.
Consider the demand faced by the firm:
D (p) = 1 [p ≤ vH ] (α (q) q) + 1 [p ≤ E [v| q]] (1− α (q)) + 1 [p ≤ vL] (α (q) (1− q)) (8)
where α (q) denotes the consumers’ probability of searching. The demand curve suggests a set
of three potentially optimal prices: vL, E [v| q] and vH . The firm maximizes its profit by solving
3The quality limits are defined in the appendix.
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the problem
max
p
pi (p |α (q)) = p.D (p |α (q)) (9)
where it takes the search behavior of consumers α (q) into account. At each relevant price level
the firm profit is given by
pi (p |α (q)) =

α (q) qvH , p = vH
[α (q) q + 1− α (q)]E [v| q] , p = E [v| q]
vL, p = vL
At price vL, the lowest possible utility realization, the firm is able to capture the whole market.
At price E [v| q] the firm is able to capture consumers who search and find a fit, α (q) q, as well
as those who do not search, 1 − α (q), but are willing to pay their expected valuation. Finally,
at price vH the firm serves only the proportion of consumers who search and find a fit, α (q) q.
Given a search intensity α (q) it is possible to determine the best response of the firm. The left
panel of Figure (4) depicts the firm best-response to search behavior α (q).4
Figure 4: Best-Response Regions for Firm and Consumers
vH
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Do Not Search
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When product quality is very low the firm is generally better off charging vL. This makes
intuitive sense, since in this case the firm prefers to target consumer who do not find a fit with
4The parameter regions are described in the appendix.
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the product, as well as all the non-searchers. As quality increases the best-response by the firm
depends on the search behavior: If many consumers search the firm is better off charging price
vH and extract the surplus from consumers who search and find a fit. However, if not many
consumers search the firm is better off targeting the non-searchers by pricing at E [v| q].
In order to understand the behavior of consumers it is useful to define βL and βH as the
probabilities of the firm setting prices equal to vL and vH , respectively.5 The search decision
provides consumers an option value that can be defined as
E [U (Search)]− E [U (∼ Search)] = (1− βL − βH) q (vH − E [v| q])− c (10)
The difference is equal to the utility of searching and receiving a fit while facing price level
E [v| q], minus the search cost. The expression above reveals that making customers indifferent
between searching and not searching is equivalent to making this utility equal to zero. The
reason is relatively subtle: When price is highest (p = vH) search offers no value to consumers
because their maximum possible utility will be extracted by the firm independently of whether
they buy or not. When price is lowest (p = vL) consumers are always willing to buy, and so the
search decision does not provide additional value either. Hence, the only difference between the
expected utility of searching and not searching occurs when the firm practices price E [v| q], as
denoted in expression (10). At this price consumers may be better off searching (when the search
cost is low) because search offers them the option value to buy or not depending on whether
they find the product satisfies their needs. At price levels vL and vH consumers are better off
buying without searching, or not searching and not buying altogether, respectively. However,
the firm has the opposite pricing incentives: When consumers search it prefers to charge vL or
vH , and when consumers do not search it prefers to charge the expected utility E [v| q]. For this
reason an equilibrium with search can only arise in mixed strategies.
In the appendix we show that no mixed strategy equilibrium occurs if the firm mixes between
prices {vL, vH} only, since in this case consumers would have no benefit from searching. Hence,
we look for search strategies that make the firm indifferent between prices in {vL, E [v| q]} and in
{E [v| q] , vH}. Consumers make the firm indifferent between prices {vL, E [v| q]} as they mix on
the OB curve, on the left panel of Figure 4. Moreover, they make the firm indifferent between
5We omit the q argument of βL (q) and βH (q) for parsimony.
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prices {E [v| q] , vH} by searching along curve BC. We denote these search probabilities as αL (q)
and αH (q), respectively:
α∗H (q) =
E [v| q]
qvH + (1− q)E [v| q] (11)
α∗L (q) =
E [v| q]− vL
(1− q)E [v| q] (12)
The firm also prices in order to make the consumer indifferent between searching and not search-
ing. This entails keeping expression (10) equal to zero by mixing price between {vL, E [v| q]}
with probabilities {βL, 1− βL} and between {vH , E [v| q]} with probabilities {βH , 1− βH}. By
comparing the firm profits of each regime one can establish the following result:
Proposition 2 (Market outcome with known quality). When quality is low (q0 < q < q)
consumers search according to α∗L (q) and the firm mixes between prices {vL, E [v| q]} with proba-
bilities {β∗ (q) , 1− β∗ (q)}. When quality is high (q < q < q1) consumers search with probability
α∗H (q) and the firm mixes between prices {vH , E [v| q]} with the same probabilities {β∗ (q) ,
1− β∗ (q)}. When quality q is either very high or very low (q ∈ (0, q0) ∪ (q1, 1)) consumers buy
without searching and the firm sets price equal to E [v| q] with probability one.
As we had explained in the beginning of this section, when product quality is too low or too
high consumers have a good idea of the utility they are likely to receive from the product, and
search brings little value. In that case consumers do not search but instead buy the product
immediately at price E [v| q]. When q is intermediate search provides value as long as price is
equal to E [v| q] with some probability. When quality is relatively low the firm mixes between
{vL, E [v| q]} in order to target consumers who are unlikely to receive a fit, and when quality is
relatively high the firm mixes between {vH , E [v| q]} to target those who do receive a fit. The
quality threshold at which the switch takes place is given by q, and is defined in the appendix.
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The pricing policy is given by
Pr (p = vL) =

0 q > q
β∗ (q) , q0 < q ≤ q
0, q ≤ q0
(13)
Pr (p = vH) =

0, q > q1
β∗ (q) , q < q < q1
0 q ≤ q
(14)
Pr (p = E [v| q]) = 1− β∗ (q) (15)
where
β∗ (q) ≡ 1− c
q (1− q) (vH − vL) (16)
and is shown on the right panel of Figure 4. Along policy β∗ (q) consumers are indifferent
between searching and not searching if q ∈ (q0, q1). When q < q, β∗ (q) denotes the probability
that the firm will set price p = vL in the mixture {vL, E [v| q]}, and when q > q, β∗ (q) denotes
the probability that the firm will set price p = vH in the mixture {vH , E [v| q]}.
The optimal search strategy for consumers is equal to
α∗ (q) =

0 q > q1
α∗H (q) , q < q ≤ q1
α∗L (q) , q0 < q ≤ q
0, q ≤ q0
where the search probability in the intermediate quality range (q0, q1) corresponds to the curve
OBC on the left panel of Figure 4. We now turn to characterize the market outcome:
Proposition 3 (Characterization of market outcome with known quality). The
search probability α∗ (q) is non-monotonic in quality. Expected price is strictly increasing in
quality. Expected profits are increasing in quality except at q0, where they decrease. Expected
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consumer welfare increases in vH , decreases in c and vL and is non-monotonic in q.
Figure 5 shows the search probability at different quality levels for two different cases. In
both cases the search probability is equal to zero for very low and very high levels of quality
because the option value of searching is not high enough to compensate the search cost, since
the outcome in either of these situations is relatively close to certain. The left panel depicts
the search probability when product fit does not constitute a significant change in utility, i.e.,
vH < 4vL. In the intermediate region (q0, q1) the search probability is strictly increasing in the
same range, but it is non-monotonic when vH > 4vL (right panel of Figure 5).
Figure 5: Search Behavior and Product Quality
(vH < 4vL) (vH > 4vL)
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The search strategy can be understood in light of consumers mixing their search decision in
order to make the firm indifferent across its actions. When q < q their search behavior makes
the firm indifferent between prices vL and E [v| q]. Suppose consumers attribute probability α
to searching. In this case the firm makes profits
pi (p) =

vL, p = vL
E [v| q] (αq + 1− α) , p = E [v| q]
(17)
since if it charges vL all consumers buy, but if it charges price E [v| q] only consumers who
do not search, and those who search and find a fit will buy. The profit from charging vL is
independent of the search decision, so consumers can only affect the profit of the second decision
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when changing α. Consider what happens to profits when quality increases slightly, to level
q
′
> q. The second branch of profits increases unequivocally both through consumers who
search as well as through consumers who do not search. These effects are captured by the terms
E [v| q]αq and E [v| q] (1− α), respectively. Moreover, an increase in quality increases profits
from the latter group faster. The reason is that while an increase in quality affects all non-
searchers, it only affects some of the searchers (those who find a fit with the product). Thus,
by increasing α consumers can reduce pi (E [v| q]) back to level pi (vL) because the loss in profits
from non-searchers outweighs the gains from searching customers. This explains the positive
slope of α∗ (q) when q < q.
When quality is high (q > q) consumers search to make the firm indifferent between prices
vH and E [v| q]. In this case the firm makes profits
pi (p) =

αqvH , p = vH
E [v| q] (αq + 1− α) , p = E [v| q]
(18)
Consumer search affects the profits of both price levels. For example when search increases, profit
pi (vH) increases and profit pi (E [v| q]) decreases. However, increases in quality have mixed effects
on the difference pi (vH)− pi (E [v| q]). Hence, it is not at first sight clear how consumers should
search along the quality path. The answer lies on whether product fit affects utility to a large
extent. When fit does not impact utility too much (vH < 4vL) an increase in quality to level
q
′ yields pi (vH) < pi
(
E
[
v| q′
])
, and so consumers increase search to keep the firm indifferent
across its price options. This happens because the firm benefits more from charging E [v| q]
and collect profits from consumers who search and find a fit as well as from non-searchers than
from charging vH and only collect profits from the first group. In other words, if product fit
cannot yield that much more differential utility to consumers who find a fit, the firm benefits
from targeting the non-searchers as well.
The same result holds when fit changes the customer satisfaction by a lot (4vL < vH), but
only when quality is high. When quality is close to q the firm prefers to target only the consumers
who search and find a fit. As quality increases, however, the gains from charging price E [v| q]
increase faster than from charging vH because the probability of a consumer finding no fit (and
receiving utility vL) is significantly decreased. Hence, focusing on consumers who search and
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find a fit through price vH becomes less attractive. This explains the search patterns in both
panels of Figure 5.
Figure 6: Expected Firm Price and Profit
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The expected price and profits with respect to quality are shown in Figure 6, and they
are representative of the general case. The average price increases strictly with quality: When
quality is very low the firm is able to extract all surplus. When quality is low q ∈ (q0, q) the firm
introduces price vL in order to target consumers who search but do not find a fit. While the
weight on price vL increases with quality, it does so at a lower rate than the increase of E [v| q],
and so the average price also increases. At q the probability of fit is high enough that the firm
prefers to target consumers who search and find a fit, and introduces price vH in the mixture.
Finally, after q1 search is no longer valuable for consumers, and the firm is able to capture the
whole market by pricing at E [v| q].
Expected profit is also increasing in q except at level q0. At this level search becomes valu-
able to consumers and the firm unambiguously loses profits because of the resulting preference
heterogeneity. Because the firm can no longer capture the whole market at a single price, at this
low level of quality the firm is better off targeting consumers who search and do not find a fit.
The opposite effect happens at q1: At this level search stops and the firm benefits from reduced
preference heterogeneity. This explains the second jump in expected profits, at quality level q1.
The result that consumer welfare (weakly) increases with vH and decreases with the search
cost c is intuitive. The non-monotonicity of welfare in q results from the fact that when q < q0 or
q > q1 no search occurs and the firm is able to extract all the surplus. Consumers do not receive
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any surplus when q ∈ (q, q1) either, because at this quality level the firm targets consumers who
search and find a fit (as well as those who do not search). Hence, the only region where consumers
have strictly positive surplus is when q ∈ (q0, q). In this region surplus is strictly increasing as
long as the search cost c is low. When the search cost is high the average price increases at a
faster rate with quality because the firm is able to extract more surplus since the search option
is not as attractive. Finally, the result that consumer surplus decreases with vL is counter-
intuitive. In all regions other than q ∈ (q0, q) the firm is able to extract all consumer surplus
and so the specific value of vL is irrelevant. In region q ∈ (q0, q) the firm mixes between prices
{vL, E [v| q]}. The first one targets consumers who search and do not find a fit, and the second
targets consumers who do not search. In this region consumers expect surplus β (E [v| q]− vL),
because of the proportion of times they find price equal to vL. However, as vL increases so does
the average price (i.e., the frequency of the low price, β, decreases), and the difference between
prices {vL, E [v| q]} also naturally decreases. These two effects lead to a reduction in consumer
surplus.
3 Unknown Product Quality
3.1 Preliminaries
We now investigate the case where information about product quality is asymmetric. In this case
the firm’s quality q ∈ Q ≡ {qL, qH} > 0 is its own private information.6 In order to communicate
its quality to consumers the firm can engage in informative advertising by sending a message
m ∈ Q. The content of the message is cheap-talk in the sense that the cost of sending it as
well as of deciding its content is not related to the type of firm sending the message.7 While
consumers can use advertising to inform their search decision, they still take the incentives of
the firm in sending the particular message into account. In particular they understand that a
firm may have an incentive for misrepresentation.
After incorporating the information asymmetry and cheap-talk advertising, the timing of the
6The results in this section do not depend on the probability of the firm being a high or a low type. Later in
the next section we denote the probability that the firm is endowed with a high quality product by λ.
7This ensures that the outcome is explained purely by informational motives rather than through alternative
costly signaling mechanisms. Moreover, the fact that the production cost is normalized to zero provides the same
assurance.
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model becomes:
Figure 7: Timing of the Imperfect Information Game
Consumers
observe price. Fit is
revealed to searchers
Firm is endowed with
product quality q
Firm sends message
m to consumers. Sets
price privately
Consumers decide
whether to search
Consumers make
purchase decisions
where the firm is first endowed by nature with a product of quality q. After it observes
its product quality it sends a message to consumers, which can be used to inform their search
decision. The rest of the game proceeds as before. After consumers receive the advertising
message they form beliefs about product quality, b (m) ∈ Q. We focus on perfect Bayesian
equilibria in which advertising is informational such that the firm types effectively use advertising
to credibly convey their quality to consumers (i.e., separating equilibria). Hence, consumers are
not naive but instead form beliefs about quality according to Bayes rule on the equilibrium path.
We focus on the cases where price does not influence the consumer beliefs already formed by
advertising. This ensures that all results are due to informational forces rather than by ‘money
burning’ mechanisms a la Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
3.2 Market Outcome
When quality is not observable consumers use their beliefs to decide whether to search or not.
The probability of search α (q̂) is the same as before but now is a function of the consumers’ beliefs
instead of observable product quality. We are interested in the case where the firm is willing
to report its type truthfully. This is captured by the following pair of incentive compatibility
constraints
IC1 : pi∗
(
L| L̂
)
≥ maxp pi
(
L| Ĥ
)
(19)
IC2 : pi∗
(
H| Ĥ
)
≥ maxp pi
(
H| L̂
)
(20)
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where pi∗
(
L| Ĥ
)
denotes a low quality firm’s profit as a function of price when it is believed
to be of quality H, and pi∗
(
L| Ĥ
)
is the firm’s profit at the equilibrium price(s). Moreover, in
equilibrium consumers are willing to believe the claim of the firm, i.e., b (m) = m.
Proposition 4 (Market outcome with unknown quality). Credible advertising can
only take place in region qL ∈ (0, q) , qH ∈ (q, q1). In sub-region qL < q0 credibility arises when
vH−vL
vL
is low, or if vH−vL
vL
is high when qL is also high. When qL ∈ (q0, q) credibility arises when
qL is low. In both cases qH is required to be intermediate.
The shaded area in Figure 8 denotes the region where truthful advertising may emerge,
qL ∈ (0, q) and qH ∈ (q, q1). The letters in the remaining regions identify the firm that benefits
from misrepresentation.
Figure 8: Incentives to Provide Informative Advertising
For example, in the bottom left region the low quality firm has always an incentive to
overstate its quality. Because no search takes place in this region, customers are willing to pay
their ex-ante expected valuation for the product. If they believe the message of the firm the low
type firm is better off overstating its quality and receiving profits E [v| qH ] rather than E [v| qL].
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Above this area we find that the high type firm has an incentive to understate its quality.
In this region the quality of the high type firm is high but not high enough that it wants to
extract profits mainly from those customers who search and find a fit with the product. Hence,
if believed the high type firm is better off imitating the low type firm in order to reduce search
or eliminate it altogether.
On the top region (qH > q1) the low type firm has always an incentive to imitate the high
type one. By doing so it could earn profit E [v| qH ] if believed. This is more than it can ever earn
if it communicates its type truthfully.8 The last region where credibility cannot occur is when
q < qL < qH < q1. In this region firms mix in the price support {E [v| qj] , vH}, and consumers
search with some probability. Because in this region the firms target consumers who search and
find a fit, the low type firm is always better off imitating the high type firm in order to extract
rents from more searching customers, or from those who did not search but are now willing to
pay E [v| qH ] rather than E [v| qL]. The high type firm may also want to imitate the low type
firm if this means an increase in the search probability. As we discussed in the previous section,
this can only take place if fit provides a significant increase in utility (vH > 4vL).
Credibility can emerge when {qL ∈ (0, q0) , qH ∈ (q, q1)}. In this case the low type firm
earns profit pi
(
L| L̂
)
= E [v| qL]. If believed, by imitating the high type firm it can earn
pi
(
L| Ĥ
)
= E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH)) instead. In this case its margin increases from
E [v| qL] to E [v| qH ], but demand drops from 1 to 1 − (1− qL)α∗H (qH) because by claiming
to be a high type the firm induces search. Whether the tradeoff is appealing depends on the
product valuations and the firms’ quality levels. First, note that we can rewrite the gain in
margin from misrepresentation as a function of vH−vL
vL
:
E [v| qH ]
E [v| qL] =
vL + qH (vH − vL)
vL + qL (vH − vL) =
1 + qH vH−vLvL
1 + qL vH−vLvL
. (21)
and as well as the loss in demand:
1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH) = 1−
(1− qL) (vL + qH (vH − vL))
(2− qH) qH (vH − vL) + vL = 1−
(1− qL)
(
1 + qH vH−vLvL
)
1 + (2− qH) qH vH−vLvL
(22)
It is easy to verify that both the gain in margin and the loss in demand from misrepresentation
8We show this in detail, in the appendix.
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Figure 9: Incentives to Provide Informative Advertising, (qL < q0)
vH−vL
vL
< v
′ vH−vL
vL
> v
′
are increasing in vH−vL
vL
, and that the first is steeper than the second. When vH−vL
vL
is low the
firm does not gain enough from misrepresentation in terms of margin to compensate the loss in
demand induced by search. When ratio vH−vL
vL
is high the benefit from increased margins offsets
the loss in search as long as qL is low. In this case the firm is better off overstating its type in
order to receive higher margins from less customers. These cases are depicted in the first row of
Figure 9. In the first case (top-left cell) misrepresentation is never attractive, but in the second
case (top-right cell) misrepresentation is attractive as long as qL is low. The second row depicts
the truth-telling parameter space in this sub-region, where the letters denote the firm with an
incentive to misreport, as before. In the first case (bottom-left cell) the low type firm never has
an incentive to misreport. In the second case however (bottom-right cell) qL must be sufficiently
high for credibility to arise. The shape of area L in the bottom-right cell derives from the fact
that pi
(
L| Ĥ
)
is concave in qH .
The high type firm may also have an incentive to misreport its type, because by doing
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so it increases demand and receives pi
(
H| L̂
)
= E [v| qL] rather than pi
(
H| Ĥ
)
=E [v| qH ]
(1− (1− qH)α∗H (qH)). Profits pi
(
H| Ĥ
)
are increasing in qH such that the firm will only want
to misrepresent itself when qH is low. In the appendix we show that in this sub-region only one
of the firms may have an incentive for misrepresentation.
Credibility can also emerge when {qL ∈ (q0, q) , qH ∈ (q, q1)}. Unlike in the previous case,
in this region qL is high enough to induce some degree of search by consumers. The profit
of the low-type firm under truthful advertising is pi
(
L| L̂
)
= vL because consumers search to
make the low type firm indifferent between prices vL and E [v| qL]. In this region the low-type
firm’s profits are independent of its quality. If the firm overstates its quality it receives profits
pi
(
L| Ĥ
)
= E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH)) which is increasing in qL due to the increased fit of
searching customers. Hence, the low-type firm is willing to advertise truthfully as long as its
quality is not too high.
The high-type firm profits pi
(
H| Ĥ
)
=α∗H (qH) qHvH =E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qH)α∗H (qH)) when
advertising truthfully. By charging p = vH the high type firm can always profit from deviating
as long as it can induce more search, since in this case it earns pi
(
H| L̂
)
= α∗L (qL) qHvH .
When α∗L (qL) < α∗H (qH), however, its best deviating option is to charge p = E [v| qL] and
earn pi
(
H| L̂
)
= E [v| qL] (1− (1− qH)α∗L (qL)). The deviation is profitable for low levels of
vH−vL
vL
. The loss in margin and the gain in demand from misrepresentation both decrease with
vH−vL
vL
, although demand increases at a faster rate. When vH−vL
vL
is low the demand increase from
imitating the low-type firm does not compensate the loss in margin, and the high-type firm is
better off advertising truthfully.
Figure 10: Incentives to Provide Informative Advertising (q0 < qL < q)
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Figure 10 provides an illustration of the regions of interest at a specific set of parameter
values. The left panel depicts the fact that the low-type firm is better off imitating the high-
type firm as long as its quality is high enough. The right panel depicts the truth-telling region
in the {qL, qH} space, and the letters identify the company that is better off deviating in a
particular region.9 The low-type firm is better off advertising truthfully as long as qL is lower
than the upper bound of the shaded region on the right panel of Figure 10. The high type firm
is better off advertising truthfully as long as vH−vL
vL
> v
′′ . Threshold v′′ is decreasing in qH , such
that the high quality firm has a higher incentive to advertise truthfully at higher values of qH .
This translates into qH being above the lower bound of the shaded region in the same panel.
Unlike in the previous region, in this case firms may have a simultaneous incentive to misre-
port their types. It suffices that α∗H (qH) < α∗L (qL). If believed the high type firm can increase
profits by deviating and charging p = vH . The low type firm can also increase profits in this
case by charging p = E [v| qH ] and earning pi
(
L| Ĥ
)
= E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH)), which is
trivially higher than what she can earn by communicating truthfully.
In summary, advertising credibility can only arise when qH ∈ (q, q1). Two cases exist in this
region, qL < q0 and qL ∈ (q0, q). In the first case credibility arises whenever vH−vLvL is low or if
vH−vL
vL
is high, qL is high enough. Moreover, qH must also be high for the high-type firm not to
have an incentive to understate its product quality. Otherwise, by understating its quality the
high-type firm can deter search and increase profits. When qL ∈ (q0, q) credibility is supported
by a low level of qL such that the low-type firm has no incentive to overstate its quality because
of lost customers due to increased search. The high-type firm will advertise truthfully as long
as vH−vL
vL
is high, in which case a deviation would lower margins too much to be attractive.
Equivalently, qH must be high for credibility to take place. We now characterize the market
outcome:
Proposition 5 (Characterization of market outcome with informative advertis-
ing). Under truthful advertising the ex-ante price is strictly increasing in both quality levels.
Ex-ante profit is strictly increasing in both quality levels, except at qL = q0, where it is decreas-
ing. Ex-ante price and profits both increase with the probability of the firm being the high type
but consumer surplus is either unaltered or decreases.
9The truth-telling region can be made much smaller or larger depending on the specific parameters used.
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The result follows from Proposition 3, because the informative cases are a linear combination
of cases with known product quality. The difference is that for a strictly positive probability
of the firm selling a high quality product - λ ∈ (0, 1) - ex-ante profits are strictly increasing in
both quality levels (except at qL = q0). And since the high quality firm always charges more
and earns higher profits than the low quality firm, it follows that ex-ante price and profits are
also increasing in λ.
The results for consumer surplus also follow from Proposition 3. A surprising result is that
consumer surplus may decrease with λ, in particular when qL ∈ (q0, q) because consumers can
only earn positive surplus when they face the low-type firm.10 Hence, consumers become worse
off as the probability of them facing the higher quality firm increases.
4 Discussion
In this section we discuss two central features of our model, namely the emergence of mixed
strategies and preference dispersion induced by search.
The mixed strategy outcome is related to the Diamond paradox, i.e., the fact that in a
market with strictly positive search costs the firms’ optimal strategy is to charge monopoly
price, ultimately discouraging search and trade activity altogether (see Diamond (1971); see also
Iyer and Kuksov (2012) for a detailed discussion). The argument is usually applicable to settings
where consumers are required to incur a search cost in order to learn the price and ultimately
buy. However, in our case consumers are allowed to buy without incurring the search cost:
consumers can decide how much information they would like to acquire before deciding whether
to buy. Together with the pricing decision by the firm this generates endogenous willingness-to-
pay dispersion from otherwise homogeneous consumers.
The mixed strategy outcome does not depend the discrete/continuous nature of utility. For
example, consider some consumers (indexed by i) who decide whether to search a firm with
(known) product quality q. By searching consumers can learn their gross valuation vi = q + εi,
where εi is uniformly distributed with support [−γ, γ] and is independent across consumers.
10When qL < q0 the firm is able to extract all of the surplus, and so λ has no effect.
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Consumer i’s ex-ante utility from searching is given by
E [U (Search)] = Pr (Buy)E [U |Buy]− c
= Pr (vi > p̂)E [vi − p̂| vi > p̂]− c
= (γ + q − p̂)
2
4γ − c
As before, consumers may also decide not to search, from which they receive expected utility
equal to max {E (vi)− p̂, 0}. The analysis in Gardete (2013) implies that an outcome with
search in pure strategies exists whenever 3γ ≥ q, i.e., when uncertainty is high enough relative
to the deterministic component of utility. However, it is easy to show that when product
uncertainty is less important (3γ < q) the outcome with mixed strategies emerges. In this
case when p̂ ∈
[
q − γ + 2√cγ, q + γ − 2√cγ
]
consumers would rather search; however, the firm
would be better off pricing at p = q−γ, at which point consumers would rather buy immediately
without searching. This scenario is not an equilibrium outcome either because when consumers
buy without searching the firm prefers to charge p = q, at which point consumers would be
better off searching before buying.
The forces behind the emergence of an outcome in mixed strategies in this case are the same
as in our model: When the firm has an incentive to extract all consumer surplus after search,
consumers may prefer to buy without searching, at which point the firm may prefer to charge
a different price, equal to the ex-ante valuation. However, at that price consumers prefer to
search as long as the search cost is low, at which point the firm has an incentive to deviate
again. Although Gardete (2013) does not focus on this case, it suffices that uncertainty is low
and consumers be allowed to buy without searching for the mixed strategy outcome to arise.
Another fundamental feature of our model is that search induces dispersion in consumer
preferences, which makes firms eager to discourage it in some conditions. To illustrate this,
consider an individual who is getting interested in photography, and would like to buy a better
camera. Being a novice she is uncertain about the model she should opt for: Cameras are
extremely diverse and cater to different needs. Until she knows the extent of her liking for
photography and what future opportunities may arise she is left to consider multiple scenarios
and their likelihoods: She may discover she really loves photography to the extent of pursuing it
as a career, or instead that only a few casual pictures will suffice. When no more information is
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available the consumer’s willingness-to-pay depends on her assessment of the potential scenarios,
their probabilities and her liking for each one. In this situation consumers may decide to take a
photography course or procure further information to understand their preferences and evaluate
the likelihood of the scenarios better. Some consumers will discover they love photography.
In their case willingness-to-pay increases after information acquisition. Others’ willingnesses-
to-pay may decrease or stay relatively unchanged. Consumers have a relatively similar prior
before search because they integrate over a number of different scenarios. After search different
scenarios become important for different individuals and more diverse preferences emerge in the
market.
This result can hold even when preference heterogeneity precedes information acquisition. To
see this consider the case where a consumers’ true utility for a product is u = q+εi−p, where εi ∼
N (0, σ2ε). Consumers do not know shock εi, but they can learn it through costly search. If they
decide to search they learn εi. In this case the variance of their willingness-to-pay (“preference
heterogeneity”) is equal to σ2ε . Consumers have heterogeneous preferences before searching.
For example, they may have received some information (through conversations with friends, for
example) about how the product may fit their needs. Let this information be signal si = εi + ηi,
ηi ∼ N
(
0, σ2η
)
. Given this signal, their willingness-to-pay is equal to q+ σ2ε
σ2ε+σ2η
si, which depends
on the specific information each consumer received, si. If they opt not to search the variance
of their gross utility is equal to V
(
q + σ2ε
σ2ε+σ2η
si
)
=
(
σ2ε
σ2ε+σ2η
)2
V (si) = σ
4
ε
σ2ε+σ2η
. This variance is
always lower than the variance of willingness-to-pay after search, σ2ε , because search ‘collapses’
the expectation of term εi into one realization, leading to a higher preference heterogeneity in
willingnesses-to-pay.
5 Conclusion
We have discussed a model of strategic communication where the firm is able to convey infor-
mation about its product quality to consumers, and consumers are willing to believe her. This
result holds despite the firm facing consumers with homogeneous preferences. A fundamental
assumption is that consumers are allowed to buy without searching. In this case they become
differentiated due to the search decisions they take.
A driving force enabling credibility to arise is that search increases the heterogeneity in
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willingness-to-pay of consumers. This creates an incentive for firms not to overstate their quality,
because doing so decreases their capability of appropriating value. In turn, they may prefer not
to understate their quality because if believed this reduces consumers’ willingness-to-pay. This
rationale is quite general and does not depend on the discreteness of the search outcome nor on
whether preferences are ex-ante homogeneous.
We have also uncovered a number of additional results. First, when quality is known the
firm does not benefit from higher product quality necessarily. In particular, its profits decrease
at q0 because at this threshold consumers find search advantageous. This change introduces
downward pressure on the profits of the firm.
Consumer surplus is also non-monotonic in quality because when the search regime initiates
the firm prefers to target consumers who search and do not find a fit, due to its low quality.
Surprisingly, consumer surplus is decreasing in vL as this decreases the option value of searching.
We find that credible communication may arise when qL is low and qH is intermediate. In this
situation the low quality firm has no incentive to imitate the high quality firm, as it will induce
more search. Simultaneously, the high type firm has no incentive to imitate the low quality
firm because it will induce preference heterogeneity, and it will be harder for her to appropriate
value. While market price and profits increase with product quality, consumer surplus may
decrease because the high type firm targets consumers who search and find that the product fits
their needs. When these consumers are targeted they receive little surplus; only just enough to
compensate their search effort. In turn, consumers who do not find a fit prefer to walk away.
The main forces at play do not depend on whether utility has discrete or continuous outcomes,
or whether consumers have ex-ante homogeneous beliefs. While we have not fully characterized
those situations, doing so may provide novel insights. We also abstract from reputation and the
role of competition, two forces that are likely to play a role in informative advertising but that
have been largely ignored by the literature so far mainly due to the complexity these factors
introduce in the market interaction.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (Effect of quality on search behavior)
Figure 3 shows that search takes place as long as p̂ ∈
[
vL + c1−q , vH − cq
]
. The interval is non-
empty as long as
vH − c
q
≥ vL + c1− q (23)
⇔ q ∈
[
1
2
(
1−
√
1− 4c
vH − vL
)
,
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− 4c
vH − vL
)]
(24)
where the condition 4c < vH − vL is necessary for search to potentially take place. Denote the
lower and upper bounds by q0 and q1, respectively. The search cost condition can be understood
by rearranging the terms in (23) to yield
vH − vL > c
q (1− q) (25)
Note that the quality level q that minimizes the right hand side is q = 1/2. It is clear that if the
condition is not met at the minimizer it cannot be met at any other quality level.
6.2 Parameter Regions for Figure 4:
The profit maximization strategy can be recovered by inspection. It is useful to denote αji (q)
as the search probability that makes the firm indifferent between practicing price i and j. For
example, αvL,E[v|q] (q) denotes the probability of searching that makes firm of quality q indifferent
between charging vL and E [v| q].11
Inspection of the firm’s profits at each price level reveals the following pricing solution:
p∗ =

vH , (q ≤ q ∧ α (q) ≥ αvL,vH ) ∨
(
q > q ∧ α (q) ≥ αE[v|q],vH
)
E [v| q] ,
(
q ≤ q ∧ α (q) ≤ αvL,E[v|q]
)
∨
(
q > q ∧ α (q) ≤ αE[v|q],vH
)
vL, q < q ∧ αvL,E[v|q] ≤ α (q) ≤ αvL,vH
11Clearly, αi,j = αj,i. We omit argument (q) for notational simplicity.
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where q = 2vL√
vH(5vH−4vL)−(vH−2vL)
, αvL,E[v|q] =
E[v|q]−vL
(1−q)E[v|q] , αE[v|q],vH =
E[v|q]
qvH+(1−q)E[v|q] and αvL,vH =
1
q
vL
vH
. For example, the firm prefers to price at vH if and only if
α (q) qvH ≥ E [v| q] (1− (1− q)α (q)) (26)
and α (q) qvH ≥ vL (27)
(28)
The firm prefers to price at vH if search is high enough. In particular, when its quality is low
(q ≤ q) it prefers price vH if the search probability is higher than αvL,vH , but when (q > q) it
requires a search level above αE[v|q],vH . Clearly, quality level q makes αvL,E[v|q] equal αE[v|q],vH .12
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2 (Market outcome with known quality)
Given the demand structures, the firm can mix among {vL, E [v| q] , vH}. However, given that
consumers mix over two actions a good initial guess checks the case where the firm also mixes
across two actions.
6.3.1 Price mixing in {vL, E [v| q]}
Let βL be the probability the firm charges vL for the product. The firm makes consumers
indifferent between searching and not searching, i.e.,
E [U (Search)] = E [U (∼ Search)]
⇔ βLq (vH − vL) + (1− βL) q (vH − E [v| q])− c = βL (E [v| q]− vL)
⇔
β∗L = 1−
c
q (1− q) (vH − vL) (29)
12Solving for q yields two solutions, but one of them is always outside the unit interval and so is irrelevant.
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6.3.2 Price mixing in {E [v| q] , vH}
Let βH be the probability the firm charges vH for the product. The firm makes consumers
indifferent between searching and not searching, i.e.,
E [U (Search)] = E [U (∼ Search)]
⇔ (1− βH) q (vH − E [v| q])− c = 0
⇔
β∗H = 1−
c
q (1− q) (vH − vL) (30)
6.3.3 Price Mixing in {vL, vH}
Let β ′H be the probability the firm charges vH for the product. The firm makes consumers
indifferent between searching and not searching, i.e.,
E [U (Search)] = E [U (∼ Search)]
⇔
(
1− β ′H
)
q (vH − vL)− c =
(
1− β ′H
)
(E [v| q]− vL)
which is only satisfied if c = 0. For a strictly positive search cost the firm cannot make the
customers indifferent between searching and not searching in equilibrium.
The two possible outcomes involve mixing within {vL, E [v| q]} or within {E [v| q] , vH}. In
order to check the conditions under which each mixing strategy dominates we need to check for
profitable deviations given the consumer behavior, which we consider next.
6.3.4 Consumer Behavior
Suppose consumers search with some probability α∗H when the firm mixes in {E [v| q] , vH},
and search with probability α∗L when the firm mixes in {vL, E [v| q]}. The consumers’ optimal
strategy is to make the firm indifferent between its prices. Hence, when the firm mixes in
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{E [v| q] , vH} consumers search such that
pi (p = vH |αH) = pi (p = E [v| q]|αH)
⇔ αHqvH = E [v| q] (αHq + 1− αH)
⇔
α∗H =
E [v| q]
qvH + (1− q)E [v| q] (31)
Similarly, if the firm mixes prices in {vL, E [v| q]} the consumers’ best-response is to search such
that
pi (p = vL|αL) = pi (p = E [v| q]|αL)
⇔ vL = E [v| q] (α∗Lq + 1− α∗L)
⇔
α∗L =
E [v| q]− vL
(1− q)E [v| q] (32)
6.3.5 Market Outcome
When consumers search with probability α∗L in response to the firm mixing in {vL, E [v| q]}, no
profitable deviations exist for the firm as long as
maxppi (p|α∗L) ≤ pi ({vL, E [v| q]}|α∗L) (33)
where pi ({vL, E [v| q]}|α∗L) is the firm’s profit with mixing as above, and maxppi (p|α∗H) is the
optimal deviation. The only candidate deviation is p = vH (notice that the firm is already
indifferent between pricing vL and E [v| q]). Consider the firm profits of charging each possible
price:
pi (p = vL|α∗L) = vL
pi (p = E [v| q]|α∗L) = E [v| q] (α∗Lq + 1− α∗L)
pi (p = vH |α∗L) = α∗LqvH
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Equilibrium requires that
pi (p = vH |α∗L) ≤ pi (p = vL|α∗L) = pi (p = E [v| q]|α∗L)
⇔ α∗LqvH ≤ vL
⇔ q ≤ vLE [v| q]
E [v| q] (vH + vL)− vHvL
and by expanding E [v| q] we get
q ≤ q ≡ 2vL√
vH (5vH − 4vL)− (vH − 2vL)
(34)
Now consider the case where the firm mixes in {E [v| q] , vH} and consumers search with proba-
bility α∗H . Consider the firm profits of charging each possible price:
pi (p = vL|α∗H) = vL
pi (p = E [v| q]|α∗H) = E [v| q] (α∗Hq + 1− α∗H)
pi (p = vH |α∗H) = α∗HqvH
The firm is better off mixing in {E [v| q] , vH} if
pi (p = vL|α∗H) ≤ pi (p = vH |α∗H) = pi (p = E [v| q]|α∗H)
⇔ vL ≤ α∗HqvH
⇔ q ≥ vLE [v| q]
E [v| q] (vH + vL)− vHvL
and by expanding E [v| q] we get q ≥ q.
In the text we have also discussed that when q ∈ (0, q0) ∪ (q1, 1) consumers do not search,
and the firm charges E [v| q]. This concludes the proof of Proposition 2.
Note that the condition q0 < q < q1 only holds for a low enough search cost.13
13We assume this condition throughout the paper since otherwise informative advertising does not arise. The
condition is c <
vL
(√
vH(5vH−4vL)(v2H−vHvL+v2L)+vH(v2H−5vHvL+3v2L)
)
2(vH−vL)(vH+vL)2 .
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 3 (Characterization of market outcome with
known quality)
6.4.1 Search Probability
First, note that the search probability is strictly increasing in the range q ∈ (q0, q):
∂α∗L (q)
∂q
= (vH − vL) (vL + q
2 (vH − vL))
(1− q)2 (vL + q (vH − vL))2
> 0 (35)
In the q ∈ (q, q1) the search probability is affected by product quality according to
∂α∗H (q)
∂q
=
(vH − vL)
(
q2vH − (1− q)2 vL
)
(vL + (2− q) q (vH − vL))2
(36)
where its signal depends on the expression q2vH − (1− q)2 vL, with a unique solution in the unit
interval at q′ ≡
√
vL√
vH+
√
vL
. It is easy to verify that ∂α
∗
H(q)
∂q
is decreasing for q < q′ , and increasing
otherwise. Because q1 > q
′ , the slope of search is always increasing towards q1. However, at q = q
the sign of q2vH − (1− q)2 vL depends on the relation between vH and 4vL. When 4vL > vH ,
∂α∗H(q)
∂q
∣∣∣
q=q
> 0, and when 4vL < vH , ∂α
∗
H(q)
∂q
∣∣∣
q=q
< 0. The underlying intuition is explained in the
text.
6.4.2 Expected price
The expected price is given by
E [p∗ (q)] =

E [v| q] , q > q1
β∗ (q) vH + (1− β∗ (q))E [v| q] , q < q ≤ q1
β∗ (q) vL + (1− β∗ (q))E [v| q] , q0 < q ≤ q
E [v| q] , q ≤ q0
It is easy to show that the average price is always monotonically increasing. When quality is
very low (q ≤ q0) or very high (q > q1) an increase in q translates to a higher willingness-to-pay
by consumers who do not search, and the firm is able to charge more. In the intervals (q0, q)
price is also increasing: Although β∗ (q) is increasing in q near q0 (which means that the firm
is putting more weight on price vL rather than on price E [v| q], the increase is less than the
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increase rate of E [v| q]). To see this, note that
∂
∂q
(β∗ (q) vL + (1− β∗ (q))E [v| q]) = c(1− q)2 > 0 (37)
On the next branch (q, q1) the partial derivative of expected price w.r.t. quality yields
∂
∂q
(β∗ (q) vH + (1− β∗ (q))E [v| q]) = c
q2
> 0 (38)
which is also positive. Finally, inspection reveals that the expected price is continuous in q,
which finishes the proof (more precisely, the average price is continuous in the C0 sense).
6.4.3 Expected Firm Profit
The expected firm profit is given by
E [pi∗ (q)] =

E [v| q] , q > q1
α∗H (q) qvH , q < q ≤ q1
vL, q0 < q ≤ q
E [v| q] , q ≤ q0
It is easy to verify that expected profit is always increasing within each branch. For the
branch (q, q1) specifically the marginal effect of quality on expected profits is equal to
∂
∂q
(α∗H (q) qvH) =
vH
(
2q2v2H + (2− 3q) qvHvL + (1− q)2 v2L
)
((2− q) q (vH − vL)− vL)2
> 0 (39)
The sign of the expression above can be found by showing that the numerator is positive at
the endpoints of quality q (q = 0 and q = 1) and that it is strictly increasing in q:
Num (α∗H (q) qvH)|q=0 = vHv2L
Num (α∗H (q) qvH)|q=1 = v2H (2vH − vL)
∂
∂q
Num (α∗H (q) qvH) = 2vH (vH − vL) (2qvH + (1− q) vL) > 0
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It remains to verify evaluate the expected profit at its discontinuities. Profit always decreases
near the first jump (i.e., near q0) because of the increased heterogeneity induced by search.
When consumers start searching the firm can no longer charge price E [v| q] and serve the whole
market. Instead, it introduces price vL in order to target consumers who search and do not find
a fit. Profit is continuous at q and at q1 the difference in profit is always positive:
E [v| q1]− α∗H (q1) q1vH =
(
vH − vL −
√
(vH − vL) (vH − vL − 4c)
)
k
where k > 0.14 The expression is trivially positive for c > 0. Finally, note that the difference in
payoffs is well defined as long as 4c > vH − vL. This condition is equivalent to the parameter
space allowing for search, i.e., q0 < q1. This completes the analysis of expected profit with
respect to quality.
6.4.4 Consumer Surplus
Consumer surplus is equal to zero, except in region q ∈ (q0, q). In this region it is equal to
E (CS) = β (E [v| q]− vL)
= q (vH − vL)− c1− q
The results in Proposition 3 follow from taking partial derivates w.r.t. the variables of interest:
∂
∂vH
E (CS) = q > 0
∂
∂vL
E (CS) = −q < 0
∂
∂c
E (CS) = − 11− q < 0
∂
∂q
E (CS) = vH − vL − c(1− q)2
14The constant k is equal to
(
vH+vL+
√
(vH−vL)(vH−vL−4c)
)2
4(vH−vL)
(
2c+vH+vL+
√
(vH−vL)(vH−vL−4c)
) .
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The last derivative requires further inspection. First, evaluation at q0 reveals a positive slope.
The derivative has only one inflection point at q = 1 − c√
c(vH−vL)
, and the second derivative is
equal to − 2c(1−q)3 , which reveals a strictly concave function. Evaluation at q reveals that the sign
depends on how low the search cost is: ∂
∂q
E (CS)
∣∣∣
q=q
= vH − vL − c(1−q)2 , which is positive as
long as c is low enough. When c is high consumer surplus has an inverse-U shape.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 4 (Market outcome with unknown quality)
There exist 10 regions of interest. We first focus on the regions where one firm always has an
incentive to deviate.
6.5.1 Region qL < qH < q0
No search occurs in this region, and consumers are willing to pay E [v| qL] for a low quality
product, and E [v| qH ] for a high quality one. Given that no search occurs in this region, if
believed the low type firm always has an incentive to imitate the high type and earn profits
E [v| qH ]. Hence, no credible communication can take place.
6.5.2 Region qL < q0 < qH < q or q0 < qL < qH < q
In the first sub-region the high type firm always wants to imitate the low type firm because it can
increase its profits to E [v| qL] from vL if it is believed. In the second sub-region the high type firm
also wants to imitate the low type firm because it can receive profitE [v| qL] (1− (1− qH)α∗L (qL))
rather than vL if believed. This is easily shown by inspection.
As for the low type firm, it never has an incentive to deviate. It earns profits E [v| qL] and
vL in the first and second sub-regions, respectively, by advertising truthfully. It suffices to show
that vL > max {E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗L (qH)) , α∗L (qH) qLvH} whenever qH < q. The profit
of the high type firm is useful: Because E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qH)α∗L (qH)) = vL, it follows that
E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗L (qH)) < vL. Also, we know that for qH < q, α∗L (qH) qHvH < vL, so
α∗L (qH) qLvH < vL as well. Hence, in these regions only the high type firm has an incentive to
imitate the low type one.
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6.5.3 Region q1 < qH
This region is obtained by the union of sub-regions qL ∈ (0, q0) ∪ (q0, q) ∪ (q, q1) ∪ (q1, 1), qH ∈
(q1, 1). In all sub-regions the high type firm earns profit E [v| qH ] when its type is revealed. In
sub-region qL ∈ (0, q0) ∪ (q0, q) it is clear that the low type firm has an incentive to claim it
is high, because E [v| qH ] > {vL, E [v| qL]}. When qL ∈ (q, q1) the low type firm earns profit
E [v| qL] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qL)), which is also less than E [v| qH ]. Finally, when (q1, qH) the low
type firm earns E [v| qL], which again is lower than the profit it can earn if it successfully imitates
the high type firm.
6.5.4 Region q < qL < qH < q1
In this region pi
(
L| L̂
)
= α∗H (qL) qLvH = E [v| qL] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qL)). If it successfully imi-
tates the high type firm, the low type firm earns pi
(
L| Ĥ
)
= max {α∗H (qH) qLvH ,
E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH))}. Note that if the low type firm can induce more search through
imitating the high type, it prefers to deviate because it earns α∗H (qH) qLvH > α∗H (qL) qLvH . Oth-
erwise, it is clear that E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH))> E [v| qL] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qL)), and so
the low type firm always prefers to deviate and imitate the high type firm if her communication
is effective.
As for the high type firm, it if induces more search through imitating the low type firm
then it can increase profits from α∗H (qH) qHvH to α∗H (qL) qHvH . Otherwise - if α∗H (qL) <
α∗H (qH) - it always prefers to report truthfully because E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qH)α∗H (qH)) >
E [v| qL] (1− (1− qH)α∗H (qL)). The proof is simple but long. In particular, calculate E [v| qH ]
(1− (1− qH)α∗H (qH))− E [v| qL](1− (1− qH)α∗H (qL)).
The denominator becomes (2− qL) qL (vH − vL) + vL, which is always positive. Hence, the
sign of the expression depends on the numerator, which is linear in qH , and so the truth-telling
arises when A + B qH > 0.15 For truth-telling to emerge we require that qH > −AB whenever
B > 0 and that qH < −AB whenever B < 0. It remains to verify that each of these conditions
always holds. In particular, it is possible to verify that qL > −AB holds whenever B > 0 (which
in turn implies that qH > −AB ). Moreover, when B < 0 it is also possible to verify that 1 < −AB ,
15A = −∆2(1 − qL)q2L + ∆qLvL + v2L and B = 2∆2(1 − qL)qL + vL(∆ − 2∆qL) − vl2, where ∆ ≡ vH − vL.
Moreover, B ≥ 0⇔ qL ≤
√
vH(vH−2vL)+vH−2vL
2(vH−vL) , which is possible as long as vH > 2vL.
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which implies that qH < −AB always holds.
Hence, the low type firm always has an incentive to deviate from truth-telling. The high
type firm may also want to deviate but only if it can induce more search when doing so.
6.5.5 Region qL < q0 < q < qH < q1
In this case the low type firm earns E [v| qL] and the high type firm earns α∗H (qH) qHvH if they
advertise truthfully. To understand the conditions under which credibility may arise, we first
analyze the incentives of the low type firm.
• Low type Firm:
If the low type firm deviates, it prefers to set price p∗ = E [v| qH ] rather than p∗ = vH . This can
be shown by comparing profits
pi
(
L| Ĥ
)∣∣∣
p∗=E[v|qH ]
≥ pi
(
L| Ĥ
)∣∣∣
p∗=vH
⇔ E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH)) ≥ α∗H (qH) qLvH
⇔ 1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH) ≥
qLvH
qHvH + (1− qH)E [v| qH ]
⇔ 1 ≥ qLvH + (1− qL)E [v| qH ]
qHvH + (1− qH)E [v| qH ]
which holds because qH > qL and vH > E [v| qH ].
It remains to show under which conditions the low type firm is better off advertising truth-
fully, i.e., when
pi
(
L| L̂
)
> pi
(
L| Ĥ
)∣∣∣
p∗=E[v|qH ]
⇔ E [v| qL] > E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH))
The tradeoff for the low type firm is that by overstating its quality it receives a higher price
but sells less units. Determining the truth-telling condition is simple but again, a relatively long
process. The denominator of the difference in profits is equal to (2− qH) qH∆ + vL, which is
always positive (∆ ≡ vH − vL). The firm prefers to advertise truthfully when A−B qL > 0.16 It
follows that A ≥ 0⇔ ∆
vL
≤ 1+
√
5−4qH
2(1−qH)qH and B ≥ 0⇔ ∆vL ≤
−1+2qH+
√
1+4(1−qH)qH
4(1−qH)qH . When A,B > 0,
16A ≡ −∆2(1− qH)q2H + ∆qHvL + v2L and B ≡ −2∆2(1− qH)qH − vL∆(1− 2qH) + v2L.
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A
B
> 1, and so truth-telling is always satisfied (we show this below). When A < 0 (⇒ B < 0) we
require that qL > AB , which trivially holds since
A
B
< 0. Finally, the condition A > 0 ∧ B < 0
translates into ∆
vL
> 1+
√
5−4qH
2(1−qH)qH and qL >
A
B
.
To verify that A
B
> 1 whenever A,B > 0, first notice that −1+2qH+
√
1+4(1−qH)qH
4(1−qH)qH <
1+
√
5−4qH
2(1−qH)qH ,
so we require ∆
vL
> 1+
√
5−4qH
2(1−qH)qH . Moreover,
∂
∂∆
A
B
> 0 and min∆ AB = 1 at, ∆ = 0. Hence, it follows
that A
B
> 1.
In summary, the low type firm prefers to tell the truth if A > 0, or if A < 0 and qL > AB . We
label this condition set as C1: ∆vL ≤
1+
√
5−4qH
2(1−qH)qH ∨
(
∆
vL
> 1+
√
5−4qH
2(1−qH)qH ∧qL >
−∆2(1−qH)q2H+∆qHvL+v2L
−2∆2(1−qH)qH−vL∆(1−2qH)+v2L
.
• High type Firm:
The high type firm may also benefit from imitating the low type firm and receive E [v| qL]. It is
better off advertising truthfully when α∗H (qH) qHvH ≥ E [v| qL], which solving w.r.t. qH yields
qH ≥
2∆2qL + ∆vL − v2L +
√
4∆4q2L + 4∆3q2LvL + 8∆2qLv2L + 8∆3qLvL + 6∆v3L + 5∆2v2L + v4L
2∆(∆ + ∆qL + 2vL)
,
where ∆ ≡ vH − vL. This completes region the set of conditions C1.
Finally, note that it cannot happen that both firms want to deviate. When the the low type
firm prefers to overstate its quality, condition E [v| qL] < E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH)) holds.
However, this implies that E [v| qL] < E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qH)α∗H (qH)), which is the condition
that ensures truth-telling for the high type firm.
We summarize the conditions for credible communication at the end of the next section.
6.5.6 Region q0 < qL < q < qH < q1
In this region credibility may also arise, and the method of proof is similar to that of the previous
section.
• Low type Firm
First, note that if the low type firm deviates, it does so using price p∗ = E [v| qH ]. The proof is
the same as the one in the previous section. The low type firm is better off advertising truthfully
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as long as its quality is low enough, i.e.,
pi
(
L| L̂
)
≥ pi
(
L| Ĥ
)∣∣∣
p∗=E[v|qH ]
⇔ vL ≥ E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qL)α∗H (qH))
⇔ qL ≤ 1− 1
α∗H (qH)
(
1− vL
E [v| qH ]
)
.
The reason is that when its quality is low, the low type firm loses demand if it imitates the high
type firm, in particular of consumers who search but do not find a fit. We denote this condition
as C2, applicable to the low type firm.
• High type Firm
The high type firm would prefer to understate its quality if this results in higher search. In this
case it can charge p∗ = vH and earn profit α∗L (qL) qHvH rather than α∗H (qH) qHvH . However,
when consumers search the low type firm less than the high type one (α∗L (qL) < α∗H (qH)) the firm
may have an incentive to advertise truthfully. In case of deviation its best option is to charge p∗ =
E [v| qL]. Solving inequality E [v| qH ] (1− (1− qH)α∗H (qH))> E [v| qL] (1− (1− qH)α∗L (qL))
yields
∆
vL
>
qH(1− qL)− q2L +
√
q2H(1− qL)(1− 5qL) + 2qH (2− q2L − qL) qL + q4L
2qHqL(1− qH + qL)
The threshold is increasing in qH , which means that the incentive for the high-type to deviate
increases with qH . This completes the characterization of the region C2, required for advertising
credibility to emerge. As in the previous case firms never have a simultaneous incentive to
deviate.
Hence, credible communicate takes place if and only if
C0 ≡ (qL < q0 < q < qH < q1 ∧ C1) (40)
∨ (q0 < qL < q < qH < q1 ∧ C2) . (41)
Existence can be verified by inspection: In region qL < q0 < q < qH < q1 (first term of region
C0) it is easy to verify that all credibility conditions are satisfied at vH = 1, vL = 110 , c =
1
16 , qH =
23
128 , qL =
5
512 . In region q0 < qL < q < qH < q1 it is easy to verify that credibility is satisfied at
vH = 1, vL = 110 , c =
5
1024 , qH =
157
1024 , qL =
3
256 .
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6.6 Proof of Proposition 5 (Characterization of market outcome with
informative advertising)
We have already shown that expected price is strictly increasing in quality for the case of perfect
information. Since the informative advertising case constitutes a linear combination of scenarios
of the known quality case, it follows that ex-ante price under informative advertising is also
strictly increasing in quality levels.
Expected profits depend on the particular region of interest. When qL < q0 the low type firm
earns profits E [v| qL] and the resulting ex-ante profit becomes
E (pi| qL < q0) = (1− λ)E [v| qL] + λα∗H (qH) qHvH
When qL > q0 ex-ante profit is equal to
E (pi| qL > q0) = (1− λ) vL + λα∗H (qH) qHvH
In both cases profits are strictly increasing in the quality levels. However, at qL = q0 expected
profits decrease due to the search regime starting for the low type firm. The statement about
consumer surplus trivially follows from Proposition 3.
6.7 Parameter Values for Figures
Figures 4, 6 and 8: vH = 1, vL = 15 , c =
1
10 . Figure 5: vH =
6
10 , vL =
1
5 , c =
1
20 (left panel)
and vH = 2, vL = 15 , c =
1
10 (right panel). Figure 9: vH = 1, vL =
1
5 , c =
1
10 (left column) and
vH = 32 , vL =
1
5 , c =
1
10 (right column). Figure 10: vH =
7
10 , vL =
11
50 , c =
1
10 .
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